Committee Comments: Advanced Aerial Threats – UAP Act Now

Committee Comments: Advanced Aerial Threats

Advanced Aerial Threats

The Committee supports the efforts of the Unidentified
Aerial Phenomenon Task Force at the Office of Naval
Intelligence to standardize collection and reporting on
unidentified aerial phenomenon, any links they have to
adversarial foreign governments, and the threat they pose to
U.S. military assets and installations. However, the Committee
remains concerned that there is no unified, comprehensive
process within the Federal Government for collecting and
analyzing intelligence on unidentified aerial phenomena,
despite the potential threat. The Committee understands that
the relevant intelligence may be sensitive; nevertheless, the
Committee finds that the information sharing and coordination
across the Intelligence Community has been inconsistent, and
this issue has lacked attention from senior leaders.
Therefore, the Committee directs the DNI, in consultation
with the Secretary of Defense and the heads of such other
agencies as the Director and Secretary jointly consider
relevant, to submit a report within 180 days of the date of
enactment of the Act, to the congressional intelligence and
armed services committees on unidentified aerial phenomena
(also known as ``anomalous aerial vehicles''), including
observed airborne objects that have not been identified.
The Committee further directs the report to include:
1. A detailed analysis of unidentified aerial
phenomena data and intelligence reporting collected or
held by the Office of Naval Intelligence, including
data and intelligence reporting held by the
Unidentified Aerial Phenomena Task Force;
2. A detailed analysis of unidentified phenomena data
collected by:
a. geospatial intelligence;
b. signals intelligence;
c. human intelligence; and
d. measurement and signals intelligence;
3. A detailed analysis of data of the FBI, which was
derived from investigations of intrusions of
unidentified aerial phenomena data over restricted
United States airspace;
4. A detailed description of an interagency process
for ensuring timely data collection and centralized
analysis of all unidentified aerial phenomena reporting
for the Federal Government, regardless of which service
or agency acquired the information;
5. Identification of an official accountable for the
process described in paragraph 4;
6. Identification of potential aerospace or other
threats posed by the unidentified aerial phenomena to
national security, and an assessment of whether this
unidentified aerial phenomena activity may be
attributed to one or more foreign adversaries;
7. Identification of any incidents or patterns that
indicate a potential adversary may have achieved
breakthrough aerospace capabilities that could put
United States strategic or conventional forces at risk;
and
8. Recommendations regarding increased collection of
data, enhanced research and development, and additional
funding and other resources.
The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may
include a classified annex.

Coordination of Security for Domestic Military Installations and Other
Facilities

The Committee is concerned that, as a result of several
recent incidents of attempted unauthorized access to Naval Air
Station Key West and Fort Story, Virginia by Chinese nationals,
several security vulnerabilities have been discovered. Foreign
adversaries may be systematically probing military
installations and facilities, and it is important that the
Department of Defense take responsibility for ensuring security
measures are adequate, unauthorized accesses are tracked, and
uniform reporting requirements for attempted unauthorized
accesses are established.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)), in
coordination with the DNI and the Director of the FBI, to
establish within the Office of the USD(I&S) a designee
responsible for coordination of security for domestic military
installations and other domestic military facilities.
Specifically, the designee's responsibilities shall include
tracking unauthorized incursions into domestic military
installations and facilities and attempts at such incursions.
The Committee further directs that, within 180 days of
enactment of this Act, such individual shall develop a strategy
for security and counterintelligence collection that defines
the capability requirements, responsibilities, and processes
for security and counterintelligence for domestic military
installations and other domestic military facilities. In
addition, not less frequently than once each year, the Under
Secretary shall, in consultation with the heads of other
appropriate elements of the DoD and the IC, brief the
intelligence and armed services committees on the:
1. Activities of the designee; and
2. Current and anticipated trends and developments in
connection with security for domestic military
installations and other domestic military facilities.

Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination Modernization and
Integration Efforts of the Algorithmic Warfare Cross-functional
Team of the Department of Defense

The Committee is concerned with the intelligence silos that
have resulted from isolated procurement programs that store
data in individual repositories, each with its own set of
cataloging procedures and proprietary technologies. This, in
turn, potentially limits advantageous communications among
databases, causes vital intelligence to go undetected, and
causes duplication of separately-located analysts' efforts in
reviewing other, less vital, intelligence information.
Therefore, the Committee directs the head of the
Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional Team, as established in
the Department of Defense by memorandum dated April 26, 2017,
to submit to the congressional intelligence and armed services
committees within 180 days of enactment of the Act, a report
that includes:
1. Recommendations for the delineation of efforts
between the Team and the Joint Artificial Intelligence
Center, especially with respect to data labeling,
testing and evaluation;
2. Recommendations for resource sharing across the
intelligence community for test and evaluation as
Project Maven transitions its independent lines of
effort;
3. The plan of the Team to integrate unsupervised
artificial intelligence algorithms (e.g., algorithms
that learn from data without being trained, allowing
the artificial intelligence to self-improve) into
Project Maven;
4. The plan of the Team to incorporate independent
data repositories located across the intelligence
community, irrespective of the element providing the
data or the domain they are resident to, into Project
Maven; and
5. The plan of the Team to ensure that development of
Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination technology
that will facilitate and enhance the capability of
analysts to rapidly search across near real-time
sensors, leverage historical data, and identify
valuable intelligence is incorporated into the Defense
Intelligence Agency Machine-assisted Analytic Rapid-
repository System.